js5389's version from 2015-12-13 02:09
Interpretation, Good Faith, Unconscionability
|§ 201.||Whose Meaning Prevails||(1) Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof; it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning. |
(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one of them if at the time the agreement was made
(a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or
(b) that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.
(3) Except as stated in this Section, neither party is bound by the meaning attached by the other, even though the result may be a failure of mutual assent.
|§ 202.||Rules in Aid of Interpretation||(1) Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight. |
(2) A writing is interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the same transaction are interpreted together.
(3) Unless a different intention is manifested,
(a) where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning;
(b) technical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning when used in a transaction within their technical field.
(4) Where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in the interpretation of the agreement.
(5) Wherever reasonable, the manifestations of intention of the parties to a promise or agreement are interpreted as consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.
|§ 203.||Standards of Preference in Interpretation||In the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, the following standards of preference are generally applicable: |
(a) an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect;
(b) express terms are given greater weight than course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, course of performance is given greater weight than course of dealing or usage of trade, and course of dealing is given greater weight than usage of trade;
(c) specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general language;
(d) separately negotiated or added terms are given greater weight than standardized terms or other terms not separately negotiated.
|§ 204.||Supplying an Omitted Essential Term||When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.|
|§ 205.||Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing||Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.|
|§ 206.||Interpretation Against the Draftsman||In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.|
|§ 207.||Interpretation Favoring the Public||In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred.|
|§ 208.||Unconscionable Contract or Term||If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.|
|§ 222.||Usage of Trade||(1) A usage of trade is a usage having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to a particular agreement. It may include a system of rules regularly observed even though particular rules are changed from time to time. |
(2) The existence and scope of a usage of trade are to be determined as questions of fact. If a usage is embodied in a written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is to be determined by the court as a question of law.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed, a usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the parties are engaged or a usage of trade of which they know or have reason to know gives meaning to or supplements or qualifies their agreement.
|§ 223.||Course of Dealing||(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to an agreement which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct. |
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, a course of dealing between the parties gives meaning to or supplements or qualifies their agreement.