Phil 1 final

eshapeesha's version from 2016-03-16 18:13

theories and such

Question Answer
valid arguementpremises entail conclusion
invalid argumentan argument in which the premises do not make the conclusion possible
modus ponensif p then q. p, ---> q
dreaming argumentcan't know anything about the external world on the basis of perception bc we don't know when we are dreaming and we only know what we can perceive
3 levels of skepical doubtperceptual error, dreaming argument, evil demon
evil demoncalls into question the existence of an external world.
behaviorismnothing more to the mind besides behavioral manifestation. mental state are simply behavioral dispositions to engage in the behavior .
epistemologystudy of human knowledge and justification, nature of belief
cartesian dualism“I reflect therefore I am.” Descartes held that the immaterial mind and the material body are two completely different types of substances and that they interact with each other.
conceivability This is an argument for the doctrine of Cartesian dualism, If I can conceive of some state of affairs, without contradiction, then that state of affairs is possible, I can conceive of myself existing without my body, Therefore, it possible to exist without my body, so I am distinct from my body
amnesiaThis is a counterexample to the conceivability argument, If I wake up with total amnesia, and someone talks to me about how bad of a person [insert own name] is, I would agree with them because I don't know who that person is. I could conceive of a world without [insert own name] because I do not know who that, but it impossible for that to be true because I actually am [insert own name].
arnauld's triangleThis is a counterexample for the conceivability argument, Arnauld holds that Descartes' conceivability argument is not true by saying that it is conceivable for a triangle to exist with the following properties: the square of the hypotenuse does not equal the square of the other two sides.This, however, cannot be possible because of the Pythagorean theorem.
continuity of natureagainst dualism, no sharp boundary betweem thinking and non thinking beings. there are many intermediate cases in evolution and development. no sudden point where people had souls
causal overdeterminationevery physical event has a physical cause, so every body movement has a physical cause, but it if also had mental causes that would be overdetermined
occasionalismgod causes out own body to move based on our decisions creating the illusion that we are making our body move when its god the whole time
materialismeverything that exists is physical, meaning mentl is not separate from physical. the mental is manifestation of physical. accounts for causal interaction between body and mind
monismexisting things in the world are made of only one kind of stuff. idealists thing its mental, materialists think its physical
mary argumentagainst materialism, mary grew up around no color but learned all the physical properties of color. when she saw color she learned something new, meaning that there is more to learn than what is physical---> no materialsm
skepticism about other mindsdenies that we can have any knowledge about other people's minds. I know that I have access to my own mental states, so I know I am thinking. Calls into question how one can discover other people's mental states
gretchen's kleenex box examplegretchen tries to tell sam that body duplicates can't be numerically identical to eachother and therefore dont have the same identity. just as a burnt kleenex box wouldnt be the same one that replaced it.
numerical vs qualitative identitythis a and b are qualitatively identical if they are absolutely indistinguishable from eachother, they are numerically identical if they are one and the same thing.
instrinsic vs extrinsic qualitiesinstrinsic- properties that an object has of itself, independently of other things. extrinsic properties- properties an object has in relation to other things
ship of theseusif wooden planks of a ship were replaced, as the old ones were used to create a new ship, which would be theseus?
physical continuityperson a and person b are numercially identical if and only if they have the same body. but, bodies change drastically over time soooOoOooOoOOOO
body switching objectionif person a occupied person b's body, person a would be numerically identical to person b even though they occupy different bodies, so personal identity does not mean bodily identity. since we know more about personal identity than bodily characteristics, personal identity is more than bodily.
person stageparticular slice or time period of a person's life.
reids brave officer coutner examplecounter to locke's theory on psych continuity (identity based on memory). continuity doesnt work bc if a remembers b, b remembers c, c and a are the same when this doesnt say so.
transitivity of identityperson a= person b, person c= person b. so person c must equal a
apparent memory caused in the same wayperson stafge a and b are only stages of the same person if person b remembers a bc the memory was caused in the appropriate way. innappropriate is stuff like hypnotism, crazy people who think they are napoleon
chain of psych cont person stagesa and b are stages of the same person if and only if they bekong to a chain of psychologically cotninuous person stages
david cohens monorah examplethis is an example of a memory being caused in an inappropriate way, which goes against proposal 4 bc david has been told the menorah story about him as a young child so much that its an apparent memory to him now.
deplication arguementproposal 4 is false bc if we have a, duplic of a=b, and duplic of b=c. then, b=c but thats not true bc they occupy different space
brain based psychological continuity a and b are stages of the same person if and only if they are stages of some chain of psych cont person syages and that psychological cont in underwritten by a single brain persisting throught the entire chain. abandons advantages of psych continuity views.
conventionalism about personal identitywhen there is simply no fact of the matter as to whether a and b are the same person, u have to make a decision of whether a and b are the same person.

7 personal identity proposals

Question Answer
proposal 1person a and b are numerically identical if and only if a has the same soul as b (gretchen counters this by saying that she identifies people physically always and has never been wrong. we arent cofnused about people identities so this is wrong bc souls immaterial)
proposal 2
proposal 3
proposal 4a and b are stages of the same person if and only if they belong to a chain of psychologically continuous person stages
proposal 5A and B are stages of the same person if and only if they belong to a chain of psychologically continuous person stages and there does not exist some distinct chain of psych cont person stages that include a. so, psych continiuity and lack of competition.
proposal 6a and b are the same person if and only if they have the same brain
proposal 7a and b are stages of the same person if and only if they are stages of some chain of psychalogically continuous person stages and that psychological continuity is underwritten by a single brain existing through the entire chain.

essay questions

Question Answer
what is idealism, how is it supposed to provide a response to the evil demon scenarioidealism is the monoist belief that everything is a product of our thoughts. the evil demon scenario is the case that we have been hypnotized by evil demons to believe in the world we ar eliving in when there is actually no external world. This supports idealism since they both agree that the world is composed of what we think of in our minds.
what is the argument from analogy what conclusion is it supposed to establish?a usually causes b, and only a. b occurs---> a occurs. but didnt occur to me, so it occured to someone else. peoples bodies resemble their minds so when we notice someones body we are noticing their mind. but can we relate to other peoples feelings? we've never been in their bodies or minds.
what is the argument from doubt? Explain how the argument involves an illegitimate use of leibniz's lawargument- if i can conceive of a state of affairs without contradiction then that state of affairs is possible. i can conceive, without contradiction, of myself existing without my body existing. it is possible for me to exist without my body existing. it is not possible for my body to exist without my body existing. i am distinct from my body. (if a and b are the same they have exactly the same properties.) this is an illegitimate view of leibinzs law because a person would not be able to survive without their body. just because this is conceivable does not make it possible on earth
what is interactionism? what is epiphenomenalism? why is interactionism implausible? whats pre est harmony, how does it impact epihenom's plausibility?interactionism- mental stuff can cause physical events and the physical can impact mental events. this is implausible because of causal overdetermination and the queen elizabeth objection saying that scientific laws shouldn't be breakable, which would be the case if the immaterial mind could impact the physical body. epiphenomenalism- body has a causal effect on the mind. pre est harmony- god set things up so that the physical and mental are harmonized but don't causally interact. this decreases epiphenomenalisms plausibility because it accounts for the impact of both the physical and mental on humans.
does dualism leads to epiphenomenalismdualism and interactionism can't both be right because either the mind interferes with physical forces impacting the body, which goes against the laws of physics or the mind reinforces physical forces impacting the body, which would be causal overdetermination. therefore forced into epiphenomenalism. but this is also implausible because thoughts and decisions, made in our midn which effect the motions we make and actions we take with our bodies, would then have physical causes.
what does it mean to say that the mental supervenes upon the physical? how does the inverted spectrum pose a difficulty for the thesis that the mental supervenes upon the physical?supervenience- if 2 entities share all the same physical properties, then they also share all the same mental properties. inverted spectrum- there are 2 subjects who are the same except sebject a sees red and subject b sees green (inverted). they both call things the same words because the words correlate to the opposite color for one of them. but, we can only conceive of this scenario. this disproves materialism and supervenience because it shows how people can percieve physical differences differently. the two twins have the same physical properties, and are looking at the same color, wiht the same physical properties but are percieving it differently showing the difference between physical and mental.

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