Neuroscience and Ethics

blueghost's version from 2017-10-11 12:43


Question Answer
meta-ethicslooking at whether there are overlying moral facts and objectivity
normative ethicstheories about what is morally right/wrong and good/bad
applied ethicsapplying normative ethical theories to particular cases or areas
utilitarianismGHP is the ranking principle; actions are right when they promote happiness
ethics of neurosciencetwo parts: ethics of neuroscience practice and ethical implications of neuroscientific results
neuroscience of ethicsasking about the underlying capacities that traditional ethical theories claim we have and that are connected to moral responsibility
ethical hedonismholds that only pleasure has worth or value
deontological ethical theoryclaim that there are actions that must be done (or must not), even if the consequence of doing (or not) those actions is worse than it would be otherwise; Kant; basic standard of morality is independent of consequences of actions; moral correctness depends on the maxim
categorical imperativeimperatives that say that some action is good or required unconditionally; content must be found in the form of it (as a universal law that applies to everyone) and in its demand that the will and maxim conform to the universal law
formula of the law of natureone version of categorical, any action you take should be based on a reason that could be acceptable to anyone
gyrusridges on the brain between two sulci
sulcusvalleys of the brain between two gyri
ventriclehallow spaces in the brain
fissurelarge grooves in the brain often separating lobes/hemispheres
gilacells that surround neurons and provide support for and insulation between them
the neuron doctrinethe brain is composed of discrete neurons that are a main basic structure and functional unit
dendriteshort branched extension of a nerve cell, impulses get received from other cells at synapses and are transmitted to cell body
axonlong threadlike part of a nerve cell along which impulses are conducted from cell body to other cells; sends messages to other cells
action potentialthe change in electrical potential associated with the passage of an impulse along the membrane of a muscle or nerve cell; occurs when a neuron sends pulses away from cell body through axon
neurotransmitterchemical substance that is released at end of nerve fiber and causes the transfer of impulse to another nerve or muscle or other structure
central nervous system spinal chord and brain
forebrainprocessing of complex info
midbrainvision, hearing, motor control, sleep/wake, arousal, temp regulation
hindbraininvoluntary actions
cerebral cortexlargest division of brai, two hemispheres divided into four lobes
frontal lobe reasoning, planning, speech, movements, emotions, problem solving
parietal lobemovement, orientation, recognition, perception of stimuli
occipital lobevisual processing
temporal lobeperception and recognition of auditory stimuli, memory, and speach
vmPFCemotional network
dlPFCcognitive and rational network
theory of mindattributing mental states to others and how they have their own perspective on the world; ability to attribute thoughts to others
brain regions involved in moral cognitionvmPFC, orbitofrontal cortex, dlPFC
Greene's debunking against deontological moral theorydual systems sometimes act in opposition to one another and emotional system overrides when there is an emotionally salient and personal dilemma, trolley cases, reaction times; rationalists cannot claim action right or wrong based on emotion and person/impersonal distinction is morally irrelevant so not based on substantive thought process
right temporoparietal junctionappears to support cognitive components of mental state reasoning for moral judgments and seems to be necessary for using intentions of action doer to make moral judgments on actions of the agent
universal moral grammartheory of the initial state of moral faculty that interacts with experience to create a mature system of moral knowledge
moral facultyspecialized cognitive mechanism that integrates nonmoral inputs and uses them to produce moral judgments
generative moral grammarcomplex system of unconscious principles or rules that an indiv has when they have a system of moral knowledge
doctrine of double effectdifference between doing something that has a bad outcome as a foreseen but NOT INTENDED consequence and just doing the bad thing (intended), even if the outcomes end up being the same
Hume and is/ought gapcannot derive an ought statement from a factual is statement because not everything that is the cause ought to be the case; can use strong inductive arguments but not deductive
naturalistic fallacyattempting to id some normative property with a natural property
open question argumentsupposed to support naturalistic fallacy; mistake to id moral goodness with descriptive property; if goodness were really pleasure, it wouldnt be a question whether everything pleasurable is good
moral realismmoral claims that are based on facts and are true if the facts are true
error theoryno simple moral claims are true; all moral claims are false
argument from evolutionary history (on deontological vs. consequentialist processing) system one processing is evolutionarily shaped because of trial and error so when something is unfamiliar we should not rely on automatic processing; rely more on consequentialist system 2 when unfamiliar; seems to prove too much; idea that consequentialist judgments would not have been conducive to reproductive fitness the way deontological ones were because they do not help with social cohesion as system 1 does
Berkerneuroscience results do not do the work in Greene's argument but morally irrelevant factors do; characterization of factors is rough and cannot say that emotional system responds only to morally irrelevant factors; empirical evidence is lacking; personal impersonal distinction is morally irrelevant so real appeal is to substantive normative intuitions on this and not neuroscience
causal determinismpast events and the laws of nature determine all future events
incompatibilismD and F cannot both be true
compatibilism D and F can both be true; believe that F is true
hard determinismD is true, so F is false
hard incompatibilismif D is true, F is false; if F is true, D is false
libertarianismF is true, so D is false (form of incompatibilism that is dependent on idea of F)
event causal libertarianismwhen someone acts freely, their reasons influence choices but do not causally determine them
agent causa libertarianismwhen someone acts or chooses freely, it is the agent that causes the event or choice but not an event INVOLVING the agent
Kahane on Greenesays it is based on implausible interpretation of evidence and there are automatic processes that are not emotional and vis versa; says that when deontonlogical intuitions are present, effortful controlled processing is needed to arrive at contrary consequentialist conclusion but this is ambiguous in nature and can be read as overriding irrelevant emotion or weighing or moral principles that is incompatible with util thinking; intuitiveness is a confounding variable because in the case of lying to a murderer at the door, utilitarian tendency is intuitive and deontological is counterintuitive

Recent badges