djamesmck57's version from 2017-03-04 19:44


Question Answer
Bargaining rangewar has no incentive, always has larger goal, basically what a astate is willing to lose in war
incentives to misrepresent/ incomplete info you can influence others that you are being pressured
commitment problems In game theory, a commitment problem arises when two actors would be better off in the present by committing themselves to a cooperative relationship in the future. But, if the actors know that they will prefer to renege on their agreement in the future, the benefits of cooperation in the present cannot be realized, and even a mutually beneficial agreement cannot be struck.
issue indivisibility An indivisible issue is something that cannot be adequately divided (who is king of a country or who controls an island, for example). If states cannot effectively bargaining because issues are indivisible, then war can result. However, states can make side payments to resolve the indivisibility and avoid war. Thus, we treat issue indivisibility as a rationalist explanation for war in theory but not in practice.
Actors and interests states, leaders, interests, groups, and citizens. States allows to center on international pressures, , Leaders allows us to understand different intersts of leaders and polpulation, Intersts groups and citizens allows to see differences among the population.
preferencesstates intentions, survival, security, wealth, status
interactionsbasic assumptions- actors are puposive and strategies are chosen based on thers strategies.
cooperation absolute gain matters at least one actor is best off, in coordination actors have incentive to cooperate but in collaboration actors have incentive not to comply. . there is a problem because actors have differnt preferences. can be solved by iteration issue linkage and reciprocal punishment, actors should no partners preferences capabilities
bargainingmaking one actor better of the expense of another actor, toughes issues in whivh relative gain matters
stag hunt is coordination problem have incentive to cooperate
prisoners dilemna requires collaboration and central authority better to defect for one side
chickencooercive bargaining signal resolve, swerve is better for both , but there is incentive in keep going,
collective action problemA collective action problem is a large-scale version of the prisoner’s dilemma. No one wants to produce the public good because it is costly and the benefits go to everyone. Thus, individuals free ride—they do not produce the good in the hope that someone else will. Ultimately, parties are considerably worse off than if they could credibly agree to produce the good despite its costs.
public goodsIt is non-rivalrous. Consumption of this good by anyone does not reduce the quantity available to other agents. It is non-excludable. It is impossible to prevent anyone from consuming that good. It is available more-or-less worldwide.